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Abstract
We consider the following model of decision-making by cognitive sys-
tems. We present an algorithm – quantum-like representation algorithm
(QLRA) – which provides a possibility to represent probabilistic data of
any origin by complex probability amplitudes. Our conjecture is that
cognitive systems developed the ability to use QLRA. They operate with
complex probability amplitudes, mental wave functions. Since the mathe-
matical formalism of QM describes as well (under some generalization)
processing of such quantum-like (QL) mental states, the conventional
quantum decision-making scheme can be used by the brain. We consider
a modification of this scheme to describe decision-making in the pres-
ence of two “incompatible” mental variables. Such a QL decision-making
can be used in situations like Prisoners Dilemma (PD) as well as others
corresponding to so called disjunction effect in psychology and cognitive
science.
1 Introduction
Recently a new wave of interest to applications of the mathematical formalism
of QM (especially its QI part) was generated via interactions of the quantum
community with various research groups working in artificial intelligence[1], cog-
nitive science and psychology [2]–[12], finances [13]-[21] and economy [22], [23]
(cf. with [24]–[37]). In particular, an important project was started in [6]–[8],
namely, creation of quantum-like (QL) models for decision-making by cognitive
systems, see also [11],[12]. Since QL-modelling of cognition has always been one
of my favorable domains of research [2]–[5], I was happy to contribute to this
project on decision-making by QL cognitive systems, see [38]. In this paper I
shall combine the QL cognitive model [38] with Bayesian statistical inference
in the general framework of quantum decision-making, cf. e.g. , see e.g. [39],
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[40]-[43], [44] (and references in these works). So, we shall proceed in the same
direction as Busemeyer [6]– [8], La Mura [9], [10] and Franco [11], [12].
We consider the following model of decision-making by cognitive systems.
We present an algorithm – quantum-like representation algorithm (QLRA) –
which provides a possibility to represent probabilistic data of any origin by
complex probability amplitudes. Our conjecture is that cognitive systems de-
veloped the ability to use QLRA. Thus they operate with complex probability
amplitudes, mental wave functions. Since the mathematical formalism of QM
describes as well (under some generalization, see appendix – section 9) process-
ing of such QL mental states, the conventional quantum decision-making scheme
can be used by the brain. We consider a modification of this scheme to describe
decision-making in the presence of two “incompatible” mental variables. Such
a QL decision-making can be used in situations like Prisoners Dilemma (PD) ,
see appendix (section 9), as well as others corresponding to so called disjunction
effect in psychology and cognitive science, see e.g. [45]–[50].
We start this paper with a short recollection of the QL representation of
contexts which is based on QLRA, see [51], [52] for detailed presentation.
2 Contexts, observables, QL-representation
2.1 Va¨xjo¨ contextual model
Classical as well as quantum probabilistic models can be obtained as particular
cases of our general contextual model, the Va¨xjo¨ model, see [51].
A physical, biological, social, mental, genetic, economic, or financial context
C is a complex of corresponding conditions. Contexts are fundamental elements
of any contextual statistical model.1
Thus construction of any probabilistic model M should be started with fix-
ing the collection of contexts of this model. Denote the collection of contexts
by the symbol C (so the family of contexts C is determined by the model M un-
der consideration). Another fundamental element of any contextual statistical
model M is a set of observables O : each observable a ∈ O can be measured
under each complex of conditions C ∈ C. For an observable a ∈ O, we denote
the set of its possible values (“spectrum”) by the symbol Xa.We do not assume
that all these observables can be measured simultaneously. To simplify consid-
erations, we shall consider only discrete observables and, moreover, all concrete
investigations will be performed for dichotomous observables.
Axiom 1: For any observable a ∈ O and its value y ∈ Xa, there is defined a
1In principle, the notion of context can be considered as a generalization of a widely used
notion of preparation procedure, see e.g. [53], [54], [40]. However, identification of context with
preparation procedure would restrict essentially our theory. In applications outside physics
(e.g., in psychology and cognitive science) we will consider mental contexts. Such contexts
are not simply preparation procedures. The same can be said about economical, political and
social contexts. In this book we shall not provide a deeper formalization of the notion of
context. In our model the notion of context is basic and irreducible.
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context, say Cy, corresponding to the y-selection
2: if we perform a measurement
of the observable a under the complex of physical conditions Cy, then we obtain
the value a = y with probability 1. We assume that the set of contexts C contains
Cy-selection contexts for all observables a ∈ O and y ∈ Xa.
Axiom 2: Contextual (conditional) probabilities paC(y) ≡ P(a = y|C) are
defined for any context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O .
Thus, for any context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O , there is defined the
probability to observe the fixed value a = y under the complex of conditions
C. Especially important role will be played by the “transition probabilities”:
pb|a(x|y) ≡ P(b = x|Cy), a, b ∈ O, y ∈ Xa, x ∈ Xb, where Cy is the [a = y]-
selection context. By axiom 2, for any context C ∈ C, the set of probabilities:
{P(a = y|C) : a ∈ O} is well defined. We complete this probabilistic data for
the context C by transition probabilities. The corresponding collection of data
D(O, C) consists of contextual probabilities: P(a = y|C),P(b = x|C),P(b =
x|Cy),P(a = y|Cx), ..., where a, b, ... ∈ O. Finally, we denote the family of
probabilistic data D(O, C) for all contexts C ∈ C by the symbol D(O, C).
Definition 1. (Va¨xjo¨ Model) An observational contextual statistical model
of reality is a triple M = (C,O,D(O, C)), where C is a set of contexts and O
is a set of observables which satisfy to axioms 1,2, and D(O, C) is probabilistic
data about contexts C obtained with the aid of observables belonging O.
We call observables belonging the set O ≡ O(M) reference of observables.
Inside of a model M observables belonging to the set O give the only possible
references about a context C ∈ C.
Definition 2. Let a, b ∈ O. The observable a is said to be supplementary3
to the observable b if pb|a(x|y) 6= 0, for all x ∈ Xb, y ∈ Xa.
2.2 Law of total probability and its violations
We recall this law in the simplest case of dichotomous random variables, a =
y1, y2 and b = x1, x2, see e.g. [55]:
P (b = x) = P (a = y1)P (b = x|a = y1) + P (a = y2)P (b = x|a = y2) (1)
Thus the probability P (b = x) can be reconstructed on the basis of condi-
tional probabilities P (b = x|a = y) and known or a priori chosen probabilities
P (a = y).4 This formula plays the fundamental role in modern science. Its
consequences are strongly incorporated in modern scientific reasoning. In [3]–
[51]it was pointed out that the quantum formalism induces a modification of
2See appendix – section 11 – for discussion of selection contexts and contextual forms of
the von Neumann projection postulate.
3It might be better to call such observables complementary, but Bohr’s complementarity
was rigidly coupled with mutual exclusivity. Our supplementarity may be considered as a
version of complementarity, but without mutual exclusivity, see [51].
4 “The prior probability to obtain the result e.g. b = x1 is equal to the prior expected
value of the posterior probability of b = x1 under conditions a = y1, y2.′′
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this formula. An additional term appears in the right hand side of (1), so called
interference term.
P (b = x) = P (a = y1)P (b = x|a = y1) + P (a = y2)P (b = x|a = y2) (2)
+2 cos θ
√
P (a = y1)P (b = x|a = y1)P (a = y2)P (b = x|a = y2).
The main mathematical consequence of [3]–[51]is that any violation of the for-
mula of total probability (which need not be coupled to quantum physics) in-
duces its interference generalization. However, not any violation induces the
ordinary cos-interference. For some contexts violation of (1) induces so called
hyperbolic interference. But we shall not consider this type of interference in
the present paper.
3 Quantum-like representation algorithm – QLRA
We consider two dichotomous supplementary reference observables a and b. In
[51] we derived the following formula for interference of contextual probabilities
for the general Va¨xjo¨ Model:
pbC(x) =
∑
y
paC(y)p
b|a(x|y) + 2λx
√∏
y
paC(y)p
b|a(x|y), (3)
where the coefficient of supplementarity (interference):
λx =
pbC(x) −
∑
y p
a
C(y)p
b|a(x|y)
2
√∏
y p
a
C(y)p
b|a(x|y)
. (4)
Contexts such that the interference coefficients λx, x ∈ Xb, are bounded by one
are called trigonometric, because in this case we have the conventional formula
of trigonometric interference:
pbC(x) =
∑
y
paC(y)p
b|a(x|y) + 2 cos θx
√∏
y
paC(y)p
b|a(x|y), (5)
where λx = cos θx. Parameters θx are said to be b|a- phases with respect to the
context C. We defined these phases purely on the basis of probabilities. We
have not started with any linear space; in contrast we shall define geometry
from probability.
We denote the collection of all trigonometric contexts by the symbol Ctr. By
using the elementary formula: D = A+B + 2
√
AB cos θ = |
√
A+ eiθ
√
B|2, for
real numbers A,B > 0, θ ∈ [0, 2pi], we can represent the probability pbC(x) as
the square of the complex amplitude (Born’s rule):
pbC(x) = |ψC(x)|2 . (6)
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Here
ψ(x) ≡ ψC(x) =
√
paC(y1)p
b|a(x|y1) + eiθx
√
paC(y2)p
b|a(x|y2), x ∈ Xb. (7)
The formula (7) gives the QL representation algorithm – QLRA. For any trigono-
metric context C by starting with the probabilistic data – pbC(x), p
a
C(y), p
b|a(x|y)
– QLRA produces the complex amplitude ψC . This algorithm can be used in
any domain of science to create the QL-representation of probabilistic data (for
a special class of contexts).
We denote the space of functions: ψ : Xb → C by the symbol Φ = Φ(Xb,C).
SinceX = {x1, x2}, the Φ is the two dimensional complex linear space. By using
QLRA we construct the map Jb|a : Ctr → Φ(X,C) which maps contexts (com-
plexes of, e.g., physical conditions) into complex amplitudes. The representation
(6) of probability is nothing other than the famous Born rule. The complex
amplitude ψC(x) can be called a wave function of the complex of physical
conditions (context) C or a (pure) state. We set ebx(·) = δ(x− ·) – Dirac delta-
functions concentrated in points x = x1, x2. The Born’s rule for complex am-
plitudes (6) can be rewritten in the following form: pbC(x) = |〈ψC , ebx〉|2, where
the scalar product in the space Φ(Xb, C) is defined by the standard formula:
〈φ, ψ〉 =∑x∈Xb φ(x)ψ¯(x). The system of functions {ebx}x∈Xb is an orthonormal
basis in the Hilbert space H = (Φ, 〈·, ·〉).
Let Xb ⊂ R. By using the Hilbert space representation of the Born’s rule
we obtain the Hilbert space representation of the expectation of the observable
b: E(b|C) = ∑x∈Xb x|ψC(x)|2 = ∑x∈Xb x〈ψC , ebx〉〈ψC , ebx〉 = 〈bˆψC , ψC〉, where
the (self-adjoint) operator bˆ : H → H is determined by its eigenvectors: bˆebx =
xebx, x ∈ Xb. This is the multiplication operator in the space of complex functions
Φ(Xb,C) : bˆψ(x) = xψ(x). It is natural to represent the b-observable (in the
Hilbert space model) by the operator bˆ.
We would like to have Born’s rule not only for the b-variable, but also for
the a-variable: paC(y) = |〈ψ, eay〉|2 , y ∈ Xa.
How can we define the basis {eay} corresponding to the a-observable? Such
a basis can be found starting with interference of probabilities. We set uaj =√
paC(yj), pij = p
b|a(xj |yi), uij = √pij , θj = θC(xj). We have:
ψ = ua1e
a
y1 + u
a
2e
a
y2 , (8)
where
eay1 = (u11, u12), e
a
y2 = (e
iθ1u21, e
iθ2u22) (9)
Suppose now that the matrix of transition probabilities P b|a is doubly stochas-
tic.5 Under this condition the system {eayi} is an orthonormal basis iff the
probabilistic phases satisfy the constraint: θ2 − θ1 = pi mod 2pi. In this case
the a-observable is also represented by a self-adjoint operator aˆ which is di-
agonal with eigenvalues y1, y2 in the basis {eayi}. The conditional average of
5It is a square matrix of nonnegative real numbers, each of whose rows and columns sums
to 1. Thus, a doubly stochastic matrix is both left stochastic and right stochastic.
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the observable a coincides with the quantum Hilbert space average: E(a|C) =∑
y∈Xa
ypaC(y) = 〈aˆψC , ψC〉.
In the general case (when P b|a need not be doubly stochastic) the a-observable
is represented as a generalized quantum observable (non self-adjoint operator),
see appendix (section 10). We remark that statistical data obtained in cogni-
tive psychology in experimental tests of disjunction effect produce non doubly
stochastic matrices of transition probabilities [50], [49].
4 QL Decision-making scheme
As we have seen, if for some context C, probability distributions for supplemen-
tary observables a and b are known, then the complex probability amplitude
ψC representing C can be reconstructed by using QLRA. This was the problem
of representation of probabilistic data by complex probability amplitude, see
section 3. My conjecture is that the brain developed the ability for such a QL
representation of probabilistic data, see [38] for details. In such aq QL-model
the brain uses complex probability amplitudes for decision-making.
We consider the following situation. A (mental) context C is given. The
brain must take decision about the b-attribute, given by e.g. b = x1, x2, – so to
choose between b = x1 and b = x2. The crucial point is that it is assumed that
another attribute, say a(= y1, y2), which is supplementary to b, is involved in the
process of decision-making. Since variables a and b are supplementary (under
the context C), interference angles θ = (θx1 , θx2) should be considered, see (7).
In the PD , see appendix (section 10), this a-attribute is related to actions
of another prisoner. In the gambling experiment it is simply the (classical)
random generator producing wins and losses. The latter example shows that
“quantumness” (qualitatively encoded by the interference angles) is not a feature
of a (in fact neither of b), but it appears via interrelation of a, b and the context
C. Our scheme of QL decision-making is based on the assumptions that there
are given (created by the brain of the basis of previous experience):
a) transition probabilities pb|a(x|y);
b) the probability distribution of the a : paC(y);
c) the probability distribution of the phase angles θ = (θx1 , θx2) : pC(θ).
Thus all these distributions are given a priori. One should not always iden-
tify prior probabilities with “subjective probabilities.” The previous frequency
experience plays an important role in determination of these probability distri-
butions, cf. [56].
The brain uses the formula of total probability with the interference term
to find the b-probabilities. Under the assumption that the interference angle is
θx, it produces the probabilities
pbC(x|θ) =
∑
y
paC(y)p
b|a(x|y) + 2 cos θx
√
paC(y1)p
b|a(x|y1)paC(y2)pb|a(x|y2).
The crucial point of the decision-making scheme is their interpretation:
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For each x, pbC(x|θ) is the probability that under the condition that the b|a-
interference angle is θx (for the context C) the decision b = x is “right”, i.e., it
would produce some form of reward.
By the (classical) Bayes’ formula the brain finds the joint probability distri-
bution:
pC(x, θ) = pC(θ)
(∑
y
paC(y)p
b|a(x|y)+2 cos θx
√
paC(y1)p
b|a(x|y1)paC(y2)pb|a(x|y2)
)
(10)
and finally the total b-probabilities
p¯bC(x) =
∫
dθ pC(θ) p
b
C(x|θ). (11)
As the extension of the interpretation of conditional probabilities, the probabil-
ity p¯bC(x) is considered as the probability that the decision b = x is right.
In the present decision-making scheme the brain makes the b = x1-decision
if p¯bC(x1) is larger than p¯
b
C(x2) an vice versa, cf. [40], p. 54. The qualitative
meaning of “larger” is determined depending on the cognitive system and may
be the context C.
We should also mention another QL decision-making scheme. Comparing of
the probabilities p¯bC(x1) and p¯
b
C(x2) is an additional act of mental processing.
It needs special neuronal and time recourses. The processing might be espe-
cially complicated when these probabilities do not differ essentially. In such a
situation a QL cognitive system might choose the regime of “automatic proba-
bilistic decision-making”, namely, by just using a (classical) random generator
producing decisions x1 and x2 with the probabilities p¯
b
C(x1) and p¯
b
C(x2)
Remark 1. (Comparing with classical probability) We remark that a cogni-
tive system τCL which uses the classical probabilistic processing of information
can apply the conventional formula of total probability (1) to predict the b-
probabilities on the basis transition probabilities pb|a(x|y) and a-probabilities
paC(y). Thus one can consider the proposed QL-scheme as simply introduction
of an additional – interference – parameter θ and modification of the formula
of total probability. The main source of such a modification of the conventional
statistical considerations is the impossibility to combine the context C with the
selection contexts Cyj and hence to get the probabilities P (b = x|CCyj ), cf.
with the resolution of “Simpson’s paradox” in [57]. As we have seen, a QL
cognitive system τQL cannot proceed in the same way. The formula of total
probability with the interference term contains not only the transition probabil-
ities and the a-probabilities, but also phases and the latter are unknown. Thus
even by choosing e.g. prior probabilities paC(y) (under the condition that the
transition probabilities were obtained via the frequency experience), the τQL
could not predict b-probabilities.
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By using QLRA the cognitive system τQL can construct for each θ = (θx1 , θx2)
the complex probability amplitude ψC,θ(x). Then the b-probabilities can be rep-
resented by using the Born’s rule:
p¯bC(x) =
∫
dθ pC(θ) |ψC,θ(x)|2. (12)
5 Bayesian updating of state distribution
Thus by our model the brain of τQL proceeds by using the mixture of classical
and quantum of probabilities. The whole Bayesian scheme is purely classical,
“quantumness” appears in (12) only via Born’s rule.
However, as always, there arises the problem of the choice of prior prob-
ability distributions. Since the transition probabilities and the a-probabilities
are present even in the classical Baeysian framework, only the phase distribu-
tion pC(θ) makes a new (QL) contribution. A QL cognitive system τQL should
learn itself to choose pC(θ) on the basis of the previous experience of the b|a
decision-making under the context C. Such a learning can be performed via the
(conventional) Bayesian updating procedure.
By combining Bayes’ and Born’s formulas, we get:
pC(θ|x) = pC(x, θ)
p¯bC(x)
=
pC(θ)|ψC,θ(x)|2∫
dθpC(θ)|ψC,θ(x)|2 . (13)
By following the Bayesian scheme τQL would like to maximize the probabil-
ity pC(θ|x), i.e., to construct a map m : Xb → Θ,m(x) = θmax(x), see [56].
Since the denominator in (13) does not depend on θ, this problem is reduced to
maximization of the joint probability density pC(x, θ).
Suppose now that under the context C the τQL made the decision b = x and
this decision was successful (so the τQL got some form of reward). Then the
τQL would update the distribution pC(θ) by maximizing pC(x, θ). To simplify
considerations and to extract the main QL factor, we assume that the transi-
tion probabilities as well as the a-probabilities are fixed. So, optimization is
considered only with respect to the interference angles θ.
In the case of the doubly stochastic matrix of transition probabilities θx1 =
θx2 + pi and hence we can consider the one dimensional phase parameter θ.
Example 1. (Discrete distribution of phases) Some context C is chosen.
Suppose that the transition probabilities as well as the a-probabilities are equal
to 1/2. Here the formula of total probability with the interference term gives:
pC(x1|θ) = cos2 θ/2; pC(x2, θ) = sin2 θ/2.
We remark that these probabilities coincide with polarization (or spin 1/2)
probabilities obtained in QM, see e.g. [40]. It should be emphasized that
this is really a simple coincidence of mathematical formulas. In opposite to
e.g. [44], we do not consider physical quantum systems. We now consider
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the simplest nontrivial case of the parametric set consisting of two points, e.g.
Θ = {θ1 = pi/2, θ2 = pi}. So, this cognitive system reduced (on the basis of
some information) phases under the context C to two possible angles. Hence,
p¯C(x1) =
1
2
(cos2 pi/4+cos2 pi/2) = 1
4
, p¯C(x2) =
1
2
(sin2 pi/4+sin2 pi/2) = 3
4
. Thus
under the assumption that all phases in Θ are equally possible, this cognitive
system τQL gets that p¯C(x2) is essentially larger than p¯C(x1). Hence, τQL makes
the decision b = x2. If the result of this decision was positive (i.e. some form
of reward was obtained), τQL would like to update the state distribution. Since
pC(x2, pi/2) =
1
4
and pC(x2, pi/2) =
1
2
, the cognitive system will put (in future
decision-making) more weight to θ2 = pi, e.g. the updated distribution could be
pC(pi/2) =
1
3
, pC(pi) =
2
3
.
Example 2. (Continuous distribution of phases) Suppose that all transi-
tion probabilities are equal. Let us consider the uniform distribution of phases
on Θ = [0, 2pi) : dpC(θ) =
1
2pidθ. Here pC(x1, θ) =
1
2pi cos
2 θ/2; pC(x2, θ) =
1
2pi sin
2 θ/2. Hence, p¯C(x1) = p¯C(x2) = 1/2. Thus the definite decision could not
be done.
Example 3. Suppose that all transition probabilities are equal. Let us
consider the uniform distribution of phases on Θ = [0, pi/2) : dpC(θ) =
2
pidθ. Here
pC(x1, θ) =
2
pi cos
2 θ/2; pC(x2, θ) =
2
pi sin
2 θ/2. Hence, p¯C(x1) =
1
pi +
1
2
, p¯C(x2) =
1
2
− 1pi . Thus the b = x1 decision is preferred. For this decision the maximum is
approached for θ = 0. Therefore this cognitive system would update pC(θ) by
concentrating it at the point θ = 0.
6 Mixed state representation
We remark that the former Bayesian considerations can be mathematically rep-
resented by using mixed quantum states. Let us consider the density matrix:
ρC ≡
∫
Θ
dθ p(θ) ρC,θ.
ρC,θ ≡ ψC,θ ⊗ ψC,θ
We obtain the representation:
p¯bC(x) = Tr ρC pi
b
x , (14)
where pibx is the orthogonal projector corresponding to the eigenvalue b = x.
Thus quantity
p¯bC(x1)
p¯bC(x2)
=
Tr ρC pi
b
x1
Tr ρC pibx2
(15)
is used in the QL decision-making.
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7 Comparing with standard quantum decision-
making theory
In this section we would like to compare our approach with standard quantum
decision-making theory, see e.g. [39], [40]-[43], [44] (and references in these
works).:
a). Interpretation. The crucial difference is that our formalism is not about
really quantum physical systems, but about QL systems. Thus we need not
quantum sources of randomness, e.g. electrons or photons, to perform our QL
decision making. Moreover, the essence of QL behavior is not consideration of a
special class of systems, but of a special class of contexts or to be more precise:
interrelation between contexts and observables.
b). Scheme of the decision making. We consider a specific scheme (motivated
by PD, see appendix (section 9)) involving two supplementary (“incompatible”)
observables a and b.Moreover, in general one of them, namely, a is a generalized
quantum observable, see section 10.
c). Mathematics. We consider a specific parametrization of a prior quantum
state, namely, by the interference angle θ.
d). Application. We apply our model to modelling of brain’s functioning as a
macroscopic QL system or to be more precise: a macroscopic system performing
specific interconnections between contexts and observables (inducing nontrivial
interference).
8 Bayes risk
As usual in quantum decision-making, we consider Bayes risk corresponding to
the deviation function Wθ(x), see [40], p. 46:
RbC ≡
∫
Θ
dp(θ)
∑
x
Wθ(x)p
b
C(x|θ) =
∫
Θ
dp(θ)
∑
x
Wθ(x) |ψC,θ(x)|2 = (16)
∫
Θ
dp(θ)
∑
x
Wθ(x) TrρC,θ pi
b
x .
Typically in quantum decision theory the problem of finding of Bayes decision
rule is considered, e.g. [40], p. 46–50. However, we are not interested in this
problem, since the decision-making operator bˆ is considered as given.6
In our model the brain is interested to minimize Bayes risk for the fixed
observable b via variation of the prior distribution of interference phases.
We come back to Example 1. Now we do not fix the distribution of phases
on Θ = {θ1 = pi/2, θ2 = pi}. Here p = p(θ1) and 1 − p = p(θ2) are parameters
of the model. Suppose that the deviation function Wθj (xi) = δij . Thus Bayes
risk is RbC = p pbC(x1|θ1) + (1− p) pbC(x2|θ2) = p cos2 θ1/2 + (1− p) sin2 θ2/2 =
6Of course, it could also be modified in the process of brain’s functioning, but we do not
consider this problem in the present paper.
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p/2 + (1 − p) = 1 − p/2. Thus Bayes risk is minimal for p = 1. Hence, the
brain would modify the prior (mixed) mental state into the (pure) mental state
ψC,pi/2.
9 Prisoner’s Dilemma
In game theory, PD is a type of non-zero-sum game in which two players can
cooperate with or defect (i.e. betray) the other player. In this game, as in all
game theory, the only concern of each individual player (prisoner) is maximizing
his/her own payoff, without any concern for the other player’s payoff. In the
classic form of this game, cooperating is strictly dominated by defecting, so
that the only possible equilibrium for the game is for all players to defect. In
simpler terms, no matter what the other player does, one player will always gain
a greater payoff by playing defect. Since in any situation playing defect is more
beneficial than cooperating, all rational players will play defect.
The classical PD is as follows: Two suspects, A and B, are arrested by
the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having
separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal: if one testifies
for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer
goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both stay
silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge.
If each betrays the other, each receives a two-year sentence. Each prisoner must
make the choice of whether to betray the other or to remain silent. However,
neither prisoner knows for sure what choice the other prisoner will make. So
this dilemma poses the question: How should the prisoners act? The dilemma
arises when one assumes that both prisoners only care about minimizing their
own jail terms. Each prisoner has two options: to cooperate with his accomplice
and stay quiet, or to defect from their implied pact and betray his accomplice
in return for a lighter sentence. The outcome of each choice depends on the
choice of the accomplice, but each prisoner must choose without knowing what
his accomplice has chosen to do. In deciding what to do in strategic situations,
it is normally important to predict what others will do. This is not the case
here. If you knew the other prisoner would stay silent, your best move is to
betray as you then walk free instead of receiving the minor sentence. If you
knew the other prisoner would betray, your best move is still to betray, as you
receive a lesser sentence than by silence. Betraying is a dominant strategy. The
other prisoner reasons similarly, and therefore also chooses to betray. Yet by
both defecting they get a lower payoff than they would get by staying silent.
So rational, self-interested play results in each prisoner being worse off than if
they had stayed silent, see e.g. wikipedia – “Prisoner’s dilemma.” The following
mental contexts are involved in PD:
Context C representing the situation such that a player has no idea about
planned action of another player. Context Ca+ representing the situation such
that the B-player supposes that A will cooperate and context Ca− – A will
compete. We can also consider similar contexts Cb±. We define dichotomous
11
observables a and b corresponding to actions of players A and B : a = + if A
chooses to cooperate and a = − if A chooses to compete, b is defined in the
same way.
A priori the law of total probability might be violated for PD, since the
B-player is not able to combine contexts. If those contexts were represented
by subsets of a so called space of “elementary events” as it is done in classical
probability theory (based on Kolmogorov (1933) measure-theoretic axiomatics),
the B-player would be able to consider the conjunction of the contexts C and
e.g. Ca+ and to operate in the context C ∧ Ca+ (which would be represented by
the set C ∩Ca+). But the very situation of PD is such that one could not expect
that contexts C and Ca± might be peacefully combined. If the B-player obtains
information about the planned action of the A-player (or even if he just decides
that A will play in the definite way, e.g. the context Ca+ will be realized), then
the context C is simply destroyed. It could not be combined with Ca+.
We can introduce the following contextual probabilities: pbC(±) ≡ P (b =
±|C) – probabilities for actions of B under the complex of mental conditions
C. pb|a(±,+) ≡ P (b = ±|Ca+) and pb|a(±,−) ≡ P (b = ±|Ca−) – probabilities for
actions of B under the complexes of mental conditions Ca+ and C
a
−, respectively,
paC(±) ≡ P (a = ±|C) – prior probabilities whichB assigns for actions of A under
the complex of mental conditions C.
10 Appendix: Generalization of the QM formal-
ism
Let us consider a finite dimensional Hilbert space H. Let E = {ej}nj=1 be an
orthonormal basis:
ψ =
∑
j
cjej , cj = cj(ψ) ∈ C. (17)
Each E generates a class of (conventional) quantum observables, self-adjoint
operators, see [59], [58]:
aˆψ =
∑
j
yjcj(ψ)ej , (18)
where Xa = {y1, ..., yn}, yj ∈ R, yj 6= yi is the range of values of a (so we start
with consideration of observables with nondegenerate spectra).
Let now E = {ej}nj=1 be an arbitrary basis (thus in general 〈ej , ei〉 6= 0, i 6= j)
consisting of normalized vectors, i.e., 〈ej, ej〉 = 1.7
We generalize the Dirac-von Neumann formalism by considering observables
(18) for an arbitrary E . We also consider an arbitrary nonzero vector of H as a
7We remark that QLRA, see section 3, produces the a-basis with normalized vectors,
‖ea
y
‖2 = 1. It is a consequence of stochasticity of an arbitrary matrix of transition probabilities
(which was used by QLRA to produce the a-basis). Thus we consider now a purely linear
algebraic version of this situation.
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pure quantum state. We postulate (by generalizing Born’s postulate):
Pψ(a = yj) =
|cj(ψ)|2∑
j |cj(ψ)|2
, (19)
where the coefficients cj(ψ) are given by the expansion (17).
If E is an orthonormal basis, then cj(ψ) = 〈ψ, ej〉,
∑
j |cj(ψ)|2 = ‖ψ‖2 and
for a normalized vector ψ, we obtain the ordinary Born’s rule.
Our generalization of the Dirac-von Neumann formalism is also very close
to another well known (and very popular in QI) generalization of the class of
quantum observables, namely, to the formalism of POVM, [54], [40]. To proceed
in this way, we introduce projectors on the basis vectors: pijψ = cj(ψ)ej . We
remark that pi2j = pij , but in general pi
∗
j 6= pij .We have: |cj(ψ)|2 = 〈pijψ, pijψ〉 =
〈Mjψ, ψ〉, whereMj = pi∗j pij .We remark that eachMj is self-adjoint and, more-
over, positively defined. We also set M =
∑
jMj . Then our generalization of
Born’s rule can be written as:
Pψ(a = yj) =
〈Mjψ, ψ〉
〈Mψ,ψ〉 =
Tr ρψMj
Tr ρψM
, (20)
where ρψ = ψ ⊗ ψ. We remark that, for an arbitrary nonzero ψ, the operator
ρψ ≥ 0.
Now we generalize the conventional notion of the density operator, by con-
sidering any nonzero ρ ≥ 0 as a generalized density operator (we recall that at
the moment we consider a finite-dimensional space). The corresponding gener-
alization of Born’s postulate has the following form:
Pψ(a = yj) =
Tr ρ Mj
Tr ρ M
. (21)
The only difference from the POVM formalism is that the operatorM 6= I (the
unit operator).
We remark that 〈Mψ,ψ〉 = ∑j |cj(ψ)|2 6= 0, ψ 6= 0. Thus (we are in the
finite dimensional case) the inverse operator M−1 is well defined.
We now proceed with our formalization and consider an arbitrary (separable)
Hilbert space H.
Definition 10.1. A generalized quantum state is represented by an arbitrary
trace class nonnegative (nonzero) operator ρ : ρ ≥ 0, 0 < Trρ <∞.
Definition 10.2. A generalized quantum observable is represented by an
arbitrary (so in general non normalized) positive operator valued measure E on
a measurable space (X,F) such that E(X) > 0.
Thus, for a generalized quantum observable E, we have:
1). E(B) ≥ 0, for any set B ∈ F , and E(X) > 0;
2). E(∪nj=1Bj) =
∑n
j=1 E(Bj) for all disjoint sequences {Bj} in F .
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Generalized Born’s rule: Let ρ and E be generalized quantum state and
observable, respectively. Then the probability to find the result x of the E-
measurement in a measurable set B (for an ensemble represented by ρ) is given
by
Pρ(x ∈ B) = Trρ E(B)
Trρ E(X)
. (22)
We remark that Trρ E(X) > 0. To prove this, we consider the spectral
expansion of the trace class operator ρ =
∑
j qjψj ⊗ ψj . Here at least one
qj > 0. Then Trρ E(X) =
∑
j qj〈E(X)ψj, ψj〉 > 0.
We now come back to the model considered at the beginning of this sec-
tion: a finite-dimensional space. We would like to model in the abstract linear
algebra framework the situation considered in section 3. We consider two ob-
servables, one is a conventional self-adjoint operator bˆ and another is a gen-
eralized observable aˆ. Thus the b-basis Eb = {ebj} is orthonormal, but the
a-basis Ea = {eaj } need not (but we emphasize that even the latter one is
normalized). Any vector eaj is a conventional (pure) quantum state. Thus
by the rules of the conventional QM we can find “transition probabilities”:
pb|a(xi|yj) = Pea
j
(b = xi) = |〈eaj , ebi〉|2. Since Eb is orthonormal, we have:∑
i p
b|a(xi|yj)) =
∑
i |〈eaj , ebi〉|2 = ‖eaj‖2 = 1. The matrix of b|a-transition prob-
abilities P b|a is stochastic (as it should be). However, if Ea is not orthonormal,
then P b|a is not doubly stochastic.
On the other hand, we can expand each ebi with respect to Ea : ebi =∑
j cj(e
b
i)e
a
j . By our generalized Born’s rule: p
a|b(yj |xi) = Peb
i
(a = yj) =
|cj(ebi)|2/
∑
j |cj(ebi )|2. We have:
∑
j p
a|b(yj |xi) = 1. Thus even the matrix of
transition probabilities P a|b is stochastic.
Finally, we remark that all previous considerations are valid even in the case
when both observables are generalized.
11 Appendix: Von Neumann postulate in cog-
nitive science and psychology
In general the transition probabilities can depend on the cognitive context C
which was chosen for the first (unconditional) measurement:
pb|a(x|y) = pb|aC (x|y).
But in some cases dependence of the transition probabilities p
b|a
C (x|y) on C could
be reducible. In the experimental situation these probabilities (frequencies) are
found in the following way. First cognitive systems interact with a context C.
In this way an ensemble SC of cognitive systems representing the context C is
created. Then cognitive systems belonging to the ensemble SC interact with
the selection-context Cy which is determined by the value y of the mental ob-
servable a. For example, students belonging to a group SC (which was trained
under a complex of mental or social conditions C) should answer to the ques-
tion a. If this question is so disturbing for a student ω that he would totally
forget about the previous C-training, then the transition probabilities do not
depend on C : pb|a(x|y). Since we are interested only in probabilities, such an
individual blocking can be generalized to “statistical blocking” – dependence on
C after sequential ab-measurement should be statistically negligible: the num-
ber of persons who still use the original C-context (e.g. training) to reply to
the b-question (following the a-question) is negligibly small comparing with the
total number of persons in a sample SC representing C.
We remark that this is the case in conventional quantum theory. Here for in-
compatible (noncomutative) observables (with nondegenerate spectra) the tran-
sition probabilities pb|a(x|y) = |(ebx, eay)|2 do not depend on the original context
C, i.e., a context preceding the a = y selection (by the QM-terminology: “on
the original wave function ψ”).
In quantum theory any a = y selection destroys the memory on the preceding
physical context C. For example, suppose that we prepare electrons with a wave
function ψ (which provides symbolic symbolic representation of a context C, so
ψ = ψC).We measure spin’s projection on some direction b and then on another
direction a. The transition probability does not depend on ψ (i.e., on C).
This is our contextual interpretation of the von Neumann projection postu-
late [59].
We do not know the general situation for cognitive systems.8 Our conjecture
is that9:
Postulate. (“von Neumann postulate for mental observable”) For any pair
a, b of supplementary mental observables the transition probability pb|a(x|y) is
completely determined by the preceding preparation – context Cy corresponding
to the [a = y]-selection.
We remark that by Axiom 1
pb|b(x|x) = 1.
Thus if “a system was prepared in the state ebx,” then measurement of a would
definitely give the value b = x.
To proceed in our contextual framework, we could be satisfied even by a
weaker form of this postulate – we recall that QLRA works by using only two
“reference observables.”
Postulate. (“Weak von Neumann postulate for mental observable”) There
exist supplementary mental observables a, b such that the transition probability
pb|a(x|y) is completely determined by the preceding preparation – context Cy
corresponding to the [a = y]-selection.
8 It might be that the von Neumann projection postulate can be violated by cognitive
systems. In such a case we would not be able to construct the conventional quantum repre-
sentation of contexts by complex probability amplitudes.
9We recall that we consider only observables with nondegenerate spectra.
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